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The Uganda Constitution of 1995 spelt out the principle of decentralization by devolution. 
Accordingly, from 1995 to 2005, district local governments had a dejure mandate to hire and fire all 
categories of civil servants through their respective district service commissions (DSCs). Following 
the Constitutional amendment in September 2005, the right to hire and fire district chief 
administrative officers (CAOs) reverted to central government. Critics of recentralization of CAO 
appointments contend that the shift in the policy and legislation for managing CAOs runs contrary to 
the principles of decentralization by devolution. This paper argues that recentralization of CAOs has 
confused reporting, reduced the autonomy of sub-national governments in civil service management, 
undermined accountability of CAOs to elected councils, and  shifted the loyalty of  CAOs from local 
governments with and for which they work  to central government that appoints and deploys them. To 
deepen accountability in local governments, the paper advocates for decentralization of CAO 
appointments, but for participation of central government in recruitment of CAOs within the confines 
of a separate personnel system. It further calls for a rethinking of the current call by the 9th 
Parliament to recentralize human resource in health in local governments owing to accountability 
challenges of managing the civil service in sub-national governments under an integrated personnel 
system. 
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1. Introduction  
Uganda made a radical shift in decentralization policy and legislation in 2005. This shift entailed 
central government reclaiming powers to hire Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) and deputy chief 
administrative officers. From 1995 to September 2005, local governments had a dejure mandate to 
appoint and discipline all civil servants, including CAOs through their respective district service 
commissions (DSCs). Placing CAOs under local councils was intended to deepen accountability of 
the CAO to elected representatives of the people. A locally accountable CAO was deemed to be a 
pillar of devolved local governance.  
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Since recentralization of CAO appointments in 2005, the discourse on implications of recentralization 
for accountability in local governments has largely been at a conceptual level and has tended to echo 
arguments put forward before recentralization. As Manyak and Katono (2010: 8) asked, 
Has recentralization [of CAOs] seriously damaged the accountability link between elected 
and appointed officials at the district and local level?  
This qualitative paper analyses the implication of recentralization of CAO appointments on downward 
accountability in local governments in Uganda. Data for the paper were gathered through interviewing 
three purposively selected CAOs and two elected district chairpersons from predominantly rural 
districts of Uganda, and were analyzed using thematic and content analysis. Though the findings are 
not generalizable to all local governments, they nuance our understanding of perverse effects of 
recentralization of appointment of local government staff on accountability in local governments. The 
paper extends scholarship on civil service management in local governments in Uganda from 
examining the underlying reasons for recentralization to considering the aftermath of recentralizing 
the appointment of the CAO. 
2. Background  
Uganda's current decentralization policy reform was launched in 1992 and consolidated through 
enactment of the of the Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute in 1993 (Steiner, 2006; 
Muhumuza, 2008; Kakumba, 2008; Makara, 2009). The country's decentralization reform was labeled 
'exceptional' among developing countries in terms of the scale and scope of the transfer of power and 
responsibilities to the local level (Steiner, 2006). Mitchinson (2003: 241) described Uganda's 
decentralization reform as: 'one of the most radical devolution initiatives in the  developing world'..  
Under Uganda's decentralization framework, the district is the highest level of local government. 
Below the district are lower local governments (municipalities, city divisions, town councils, and sub-
counties). The District Council is the highest political organ of local government and comprises the 
elected district chairperson as the political head plus a number of councilors representing electoral 
areas of the district and interest groups  youth, people with disabilities and women) (Nabaho, 
2012:79). Three fundamental innovations are discernible from Uganda's decentralization policy: a 
separate personnel system, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and a new power structure (Makara, 
2009:137). Under the new personnel system, a District Service Committee was established in each 
district local government (under the Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993 and Legal 
Notice Supplement 1 of 1994) and entrusted with the mandate to appoint, confirm, promote, and 
discipline all district and urban council employees, with exception of the district executive secretary 
(DES) and deputy district executive secretary (DDES). The DES was the head of the district public 
service as well as the accounting officer.  
Following the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, DESs and their deputies, who became CAOs 
and deputy CAOs under the new system, were also placed under the separate personnel system. This 
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in effect meant that they would be appointed, disciplined and removed from office by the District 
Service Commissions (DSCs).  Article 188 (1) of the Constitution (GoU 1995: 98) specifically stated 
that, 'There shall be a chief administrative officer for every district', while subsection (2) of the same 
Article stated that, 'The chief administrative officer shall be appointed by the district service 
commission and shall be the chief accounting officer for the district'. 
 The rationale for personnel decentralization was to make all staff executing decentralized functions 
accountable to local governments through the CAO or town clerk as the case may be (Nsibambi, 
2000). The mandate of district local government to hire and fire their staff, including CAOs and their 
deputies, was further consolidated in the Local Government Act of 1997. The transfer of appointments 
to district local governments through the DSCs was considered to be one of the cornerstones of 
Ugandan decentralization reforms (Bossert & Beauvais, 2002).  
3. Recentralization of appointment of  Chief Administrative Officers  
In 2003, the Government of Uganda started rethinking the policy and local government legislation. 
One of the proposed policy shifts was recentralizing of CAO appointments, taking this responsibility 
away from DSCs. The related discourse from 2003 to September 2005 hinged on whether to 
recentralize CAOs or maintain the status quo. Competing views were expressed. Central government 
was the strongest pro-centralization voice, while the donor community and Uganda Local 
Government Association (ULGA) strongly opposed the imposition of an integrated personnel system 
on the district personnel arrangements. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA, 2008:21) has 
distilled the following as central arguments given in favour of recentralization of CAOs: 
a) a central-government appointed CAO would be more protected from local political 
interference and pressures; 
b) in view of the local government dependence on central government financial transfers, the 
CAO should be held centrally accountable to reduce rampant resource misappropriation;  
c)  recentralization would  lead to recruitment of suitable CAOs; and  
d) CAOs as senior civil servants would be transferable without being re-interviewed, which 
would reduce the turnover of CAOs and avoid equating decentralization with localization. 
Let us contextualize the above issues. Admittedly, there was an urgent need to insulate CAOs from 
incessant and undue local political interference and pressures, but the point of contention was how to 
do it. Appointment of CAOs by districts − though good for downward accountability − exposed them 
to tremendous local pressure to contravene established regulations and procedures, especially on 
financial management and resource allocation (Kiyaga-Nsubuga & Olum, 2009). CAOs who did not 
succumb to these pressures were dismissed by their respective DSCs (Francis & James, 2003; Kiyaga-
Nsubuga & Olum, 2009; Manyak & Katono, 2010).  Francis and James (2003) highlight a case where 
a DSC of one district dismissed a deputy CAO, under pressure from the district executive, for 
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questioning the use of the unconditional grant for elected leaders' allowances. Central government put 
forward three reasons for recentralizing CAO appointments. 
First, recentralization was deemed a feasible strategy for shielding CAOs against political interference 
and to enhance their job security. Recentralization would enable the CAO to be independent from the 
political control of district councils. This would in turn create an environment for CAOs to operate 
within the provisions of the law as it would eliminate pressure on the CAO to approve illegal 
expenditure. Recentralization has evidently shielded CAOs against undue local political pressure. 
Mentor Consult (2008: 27) found that CAOs were satisfied with the decision to recentralize their 
appointment. One CAO is quoted in the Mentor Report as saying, 
We are no longer puppets of what they [local politicians] would say; those days we would 
be forced to do things as they wanted because it was not possible to stand up to them.  
This statement underscores the intense political pressure that CAOs were previously exposed to under 
the separate personnel system. However, there are justifiable fears in some quarters that 
recentralization may correspondingly shift political pressure on administrators away from local 
politicians to the central government.  
Second, the rationale hinged on ensuring financial probity in the use of central government transfers 
under fiscal decentralization. The Local Government Act (CAP 243; GoU 1997) provides three types 
of fiscal transfers (conditional, unconditional and equalization grants) to local governments to 
implement their decentralized responsibilities (Muhumuza, 2008; Makara, 2009; Awortwi, 2011):   
 Unconditional grants are given as a minimum grant to local government to run decentralized 
services.  
 Conditional grants are given for services agreed with central government and provided by 
local governments, and may not be used for any other purpose apart from the one for which it 
is provided.  
 Equalization grants are given to those local governments lagging behind the national average 
standards in service delivery (Makara, 2009).   
By 1999, central government transfers amounted to over 93% of the local government funding (Saito, 
2003). At the same time, cases of resource misappropriation were frequently reported in the media, 
and reports of the Auditor General. In view of the above, central government argued for powers to 
appoint accounting officers who would be centrally accountable for central government transfers and 
use them frugally for maximum service delivery. Central government would therefore be in position 
to sanction accounting officers who flout financial management laws and regulations, in contrast to a 
separate personnel system where it would merely recommend to DSCs to take disciplinary action 
against errant accounting officers.  
Third, it was argued that recentralization would pave the way for recruitment of suitable CAOs. 
Undoubtedly, the recruitment arrangements for local government staff, including CAO, tended and 
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still tends to be inward looking and biased against candidates from other districts, favouring ‘sons and 
daughters of the soil'− i.e. people of local origin (Francis & James, 2003; Kakumba 2003, 2008; 
Awortwi, 2011; Nabaho, 2011, 2012; Nabaho & Kiiza, 2013).  Instead of appointing staff 'for the 
district from the national labour market', errant DSCs tend to appoint staff 'for the district from the 
local/district labour market' (Nabaho, 2012: 80), limiting opportunities for recruiting people with 
relevant competences (IGG, 2008). The decision by the Public Service Commission to retire some 
CAOs due to lack of requisite qualifications immediately after recentralization lends credence to the 
idea  that some DSCs had breached merit principles during recruitment and selection of staff.  
Fourth, under a separate personnel system CAOs and their deputies could not easily be transferred to 
another local government jurisdiction, but had to be re-interviewed and offered appointment on 
transfer of service.  Critics argued that this approach to managing top local government administrators 
equated decentralization to localization, and that the separate personnel system confined them to a 
rather closed system where their career progress could easily be suffocated (Kakumba, 2008). Thus, 
any personnel arrangement that would enable CAOs to be transferred around the country would help 
their career development.  
However, using recentralization of the CAO to achieve the objectives outlined above has been 
described by critics of recentralization as 'throwing the baby out with the bath-water'. Opponents of 
recentralization were unconvinced by these arguments and called for maintaining the status quo of the 
separate personnel management system for top local government staff. The Constitutional Review 
Commission Report, 2003 maintained the importance of having a locally accountable CAO as a pillar 
of devolved governance. The Commission argued that without local control of the CAO, councils 
would have limited control over the entire local government performance, and that central 
government appointment of CAOs would cut the most crucial accountability link between the elected 
local councils and local government staff, resulting in a snowball effect whereby local accountability 
would be undermined (Steffensen, 2006; JICA, 2008).  
The Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA), in its submission to the Parliamentary Session 
Committee on Public Service and Local Government on Constitutional (Amendment) Bill No.2, 2005 
and Local Governments (Amendment) Bill No.8, 2005 in May 2005, vehemently opposed 
recentralization of the CAO. ULGA (2005: 9) maintained that, 
The proposal to revert to the position of LG[local government] CAOs being appointed and 
controlled at the CG [central Government] level is a recall of the already transferred 
powers possessed by LGs [local governments] in handling this particular office. It will 
confuse reporting and accountability. It will lead to more officers of LGs being 
recentralized. In the long run, the entire structure will collapse. CG already has its full 
representation through the Resident District Commissioner (RDC). The real outcome of the 
proposal in the Bill is the fact of recentralization against decentralization. 
The anti-recentralization camp also argued that the proposed recentralization would undermine the 
principles and objectives of decentralization, by weakening the powers of the electorate, through their 
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representative councils, to control technical staff. Recentralization would further raise issues of 
supervision and accountability of the CAO to districts. 
However, those in favour of recentralization eventually won, and Parliament amended the 
Constitution in September 2005, and the Local Government Act 2006, to give responsibility for CAO 
appointments to the Public Service Commission (PSC). The status of the CAO has, since 2005, 
changed from one of being a district local government employee to that of being a central government 
employee in the district.  Nevertheless, the CAO remains responsible to the elected district 
chairperson. Operationally, the PSC controls the appointment and exercises disciplinary control over 
the CAO; routine management (posting and transfer) of the CAO is a responsibility of the Ministry of 
Local Government, while the CAO's performance appraisal is handled by the elected district 
chairperson. Recentralization of the CAO has definitely changed the texture of human resource 
management in local governments.  
During the decade from 1995 to 2005 the entire human resource management function in local 
governments operated under a completely separate personnel arrangement. Uganda has now gone 
back to the pre-1995 arrangement for managing CAOs − a move labeled by some as ‘the President 
[Yoweri Museveni] killing his own baby [decentralization by devolution]' (Manyak & Katono, 2010: 
5). It is now evident that Uganda's local government system has a dual character: an integrated 
personnel system for CAOs, deputy CAOs and municipal town clerks, and a separate personnel 
system for other local government staff (Kakumba, 2008; Nabaho, 2011, 2012; Nabaho & Kiiza, 
2013). This apparent policy shift has changed the philosophical basis of decentralization by 
devolution and created tensions between the philosophy and practice of decentralization (Kiyaga-
Nsubuga & Olum, 2009).   
4. Post-recentralization discourse on recentralizing CAO appointments 
The critical question for scholars of local governance is why the provisions of the repealed Local 
Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993, concerning management of top local government 
administrators were resurrected in September 2005 through amendment of the 1995 Constitution and 
Local Government Act (CAP 243). In other words, why did the arrangement for managing top 
administrators revert to a system that operated a decade earlier and that was at odds with the 
principles of decentralization by devolution?  
The decision to recentralize CAO appointments can be explained by two principal factors: the 
declining political fortunes of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government and central 
government's uneasiness at the extent of autonomy granted to local governments under the 1995 
Constitution and the Local Government Act (CAP 243).  Thus scholars challenge the reasons 
advanced by the NRM government for recentralization of CAO appointments, variously described 
'ostensible' and 'supposed', arguing that the NRM government used corruption as a scapegoat to 
achieve its political objectives (Muhumuza, 2008). Skeptics of this anti-corruption strategy argue that 
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corruption cannot be tacked by centralizing the office of the CAO, and that corruption at the local 
government level should be tackled by strengthening the local mechanisms of accountability and 
improving national oversight agencies such as the Office of the Auditor General and the Inspectorate 
of Government (Oloka-Onyango, 2007).  Improving local accountability resonates well with the 
principal-agent frameworks which hold that corruption is a function of monopoly plus discretion less 
accountability (Klitgaard, 1988). CLGF (2007) casts doubt over the potential of recentralization to 
curb corruption by arguing that the CAO with central allegiance would be operating in the same 
corrupt environment.  
Scholars further attribute recentralization of CAO appointments to electoral politics at the national 
level. From 1986 to 2005, the NRM established a defacto one-party system which; its proponents 
called 'no party' or 'movement', but which critical observers aptly noted simply meant that no other 
political party had a role in the governance of the country (Makara, 2009). This period also witnessed 
CAOs performing an additional role of retuning officer on behalf of the Electoral Commission during 
national and local council elections. Quite often, the NRM establishment accused CAOs of being 
'multipartists' prior to the ushering in of 'multipartism' in 2005. In the past, where the NRM lost in 
elections, President Museveni accused CAOs of conniving with the opposition (Awortwi, 2011:368). 
Oloka-Onyango (2007:37) draws a strong link between 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections 
and recentralization of the appointment of the CAO:  
Why the CAO was recentralized was clearly also related to fears around the elections with 
several powerful NRM officials accusing CAOs of being ‘multipartists' and therefore 
lacking the necessary partiality in their role as designated election returning officers. 
This position was reconfirmed when, after the February 2006 elections, President Museveni accused 
CAOs of being sympathizers of opposition political parties and threatened to appoint only those who 
subscribe to NRM government philosophy as CAOs (Awortwi, 2011). Immediately after 2006 
elections, all CAOs were required to apply for their jobs alongside new applicants. Recentralization of 
CAOs was therefore part of a broader scheme by government to minimize the risk of losing to any 
competitor (Awortwi, 2011).  
Steffensen (2006), however, sees the NRM government's recentralization of CAO appointments as a 
symptom of unease with the level of autonomy of local governments, and the wish by central 
government to strengthen control. Following several amendments to local government legislation, 
commentators argued that the NRM [ruling party] had become fearful of its own 'success' in pursuing 
decentralization (JICA, 2008). Local government autonomy was manifested in three powers: power to 
make and enforce regulatory decisions; power to govern a procurement system; and power to manage 
human resources. Recentralization of some elements of local government personnel management, 
including the appointment of CAOs and municipal town clerks, was considered an effective way of 
weakening the autonomy of local governments. In parallel, in 2006 the Local Government Act was 
amended to strip local governments of the power to govern a procurement system, abolishing the 
former local tender boards that were appointed by councils. However, there were accusations that 
Nabaho  Local Government Accountability in Uganda 
 
CJLG November 2013 
24 
these procurement entities had become instruments of cronyism and patronage and were corrupt 
(CLGF, 2007). Tender boards were replaced with contract committees appointed by the CAO and 
eventually approved by the Secretary to the Treasury14. Currently, local governments have no role in 
contract committees and their power to query decisions of the committees is limited. The NRM 
government is also using intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangements to reduce the autonomy of 
local governments (JICA, 2008), and central government fiscal transfers have been placed under 
central government appointees (CAOs) which undermines decentralization reform (ARD, 2005). All 
these changes support to the assertion by Awortwi (2011:348) that while central government 
leadership finds it expedient to appear to support a decentralization policy, they do not wish to see the 
growth of powerful local institutions.  
One major conclusion from the analysis above is that central government-driven human resource 
management reforms for local governments do not take place in a vacuum; they are shaped by the 
political environment at the national level and the desire by the central government to exercise tight 
control over sub-national governments.  
5. Has recentralization of CAO appointments undermined accountability?  
Accountability, as a concept, has been in the public domain for many years. The concept lends itself to 
many interpretations. Brinkerhoff (2001:2) opines that the essence of accountability is answerability; 
being accountable means having the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions and/or 
actions. Accountability has two important dimensions: answerability and enforcement. Answerability 
refers to the obligation to provide information and explanations concerning decisions and actions 
while enforcement is the ability to oversee actors and apply sanctions when they give unsatisfactory 
answers (Brinkerhoff, 2001:2-5). Recentralization of the CAO has apparently impacted on 
accountability in local governments in two major ways: shift in reporting and allegiance of top 
administrators in districts; and weakening control over the CAO by elected councils. 
Shift in reporting and allegiance   
No servant can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he 
will be loyal to the one and despise the other … (Luke 16:13,NKJV). 
Recentralization has created two masters for the CAO: the district council and central government. 
This has shifted the pattern of reporting for the CAO from being uni-directional to being bi-
directional. Currently, the CAO reports upward to central government and downward to the district 
council. Asked about implications of recentralization on reporting arrangements for top administrators 
in local governments, one respondent said, 'Recentralization [of CAO appointments] has created two 
reporting centres', which has attendant implications for accountability of the highest civil servant in 
                                                            
14   The permanent secretary in charge of finance, planning and economic development 
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district local governments. As one key informant put it, 'The CAO looks to the central government as 
the priority reporting centre'. 
 There was a general consensus among the two elected district chairpersons interviewed that CAOs 
were mostly preoccupied with accountability to central government, which has in turn softened 
accountability in local governments. This finding did not come as a surprise since central government 
wields substantial power over the CAO by virtue of being the appointing, posting and sanctioning 
authority. Practically, the recruiter of the CAO (central government) and a mere recipient of the CAO 
(local government) cannot have the same standing. 
Similarly, there was a general perception among elected district chairpersons and CAOs interviewed 
for this research that two-way reporting had considerably affected the loyalty of the CAOs, who now 
suffer from ‘operational' loyalty to local councils and their ‘career' loyalty to central masters. An 
acting CAO who had served in three local governments after recentralization spoke of how 
challenging it was for the CAO to please both powers. One CAO described the current dilemma of 
CAOs as 'being caught between a rock and a hard place'. The hardest choice a CAO has to make is 
whether his/her loyalty should lean more to the 'local governments with and for which he/she works' 
or to the central government that appoints and deploys him/her to districts. Another CAO likened the 
current predicament of CAOs to "a woman married to two husbands".  
Elected district chairpersons were of the view that CAOs had strategically shifted their allegiance to 
central government. They revealed that some CAOs now conveniently ignore a local council directive 
if this is not in the interest of central government. However, CAOs cannot completely ignore loyalty 
to local governments, since they are assigned to help local governments fulfill their statutory powers. 
This dichotomy reinforces the argument that an integrated personnel system occasions split loyalties 
for senior officials managing decentralized services (Nabaho, 2012). Thus an integrated personnel 
system appears to be the antithesis of decentralization by devolution. One conclusion that stems from 
the above discussion is that in a decentralized context, civil servants tend to owe allegiance to a local 
government they are appointed to serve rather than one in which they are assigned to work by central 
government.  
At a policy level, the findings of this qualitative study on unintended consequences of human resource 
recentralization for employee loyalty should inform the current debate in Uganda on whether to 
recentralize the appointments of health sector staff employed through local governments. The 
Parliamentary Committee on Health (Parliament of Uganda: 2012: 25) has already recommended to 
Parliament that, 
… recruitment and supervision of health workers in lower health centres [district hospitals 
and health centres 2 to 4] should be recentralized to make it possible for the Health 
Service Commission to recruit them instead of the District Service Commissions, which in 
most cases lack the capacity. 
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The committee intends to move a Private Member's Bill to that effect. The findings in this paper, 
suggest that accountability and loyalty concerns should be integral to debates on whether to 
recentralize human resource management for health staff or to maintain the status quo. The debate 
should also be underpinned by scholarly analysis of other local governance systems in Africa that 
attest to perverse effects of central government appointment and posting of civil servants to local 
governments. With reference to Ghana, Awortwi (2011: 367-368) writes, 
Civil servants have no allegiance to the LG [local government] in whose jurisdiction they 
work and they frequently ignore LG policies and priorities, refuse to attend meetings with 
locally elected officials, and generally maintain allegiance to the CG [central 
government]. Locally elected councilors face severe frustrations in the very assembly they 
are supposed to control. 
It is therefore advisable that central government should conduct a thorough evaluation of 
recentralization of CAO appointments on service delivery in local government before recentralizing 
more local government staff. From the perspective of political heads of districts (the two elected 
district officers interviewed), there is anecdotal evidence that recentralization has not achieved much, 
save ensuring job security for CAOs and giving the function a national outlook. As one said, 
'Recentralization has caused more harm than good to local government service delivery'.   
According to elected district officers, its effects have been threefold. First, CAOs are out of their duty 
stations (districts) most of the time since they have to balance performing their official duties and 
attending to their 'non-resident' families − some CAOs were described as 'visitors to districts' and their 
absence as 'a norm rather than an exception'. Quite often, CAOs do not seek permission from elected 
district chairpersons (to whom they are responsible) to be away from work and from districts, and 
chairperson, a former senior civil servant, said that he recently had to issue a warning letter to a CAO 
over rampant absenteeism from the district without permission. The elected district chairpersons 
argued that perennial absence of CAOs affects district operations and partly explains why districts 
return billions of unspent central government transfers to the national treasury at the end of the 
financial year. Re-remittance of central government transfers to the national treasury is not confined to 
the districts in this study, and Kaberamaido district reportedly returned 400 million Uganda shillings 
(150,944 United States dollars)  to the national treasury at the end of 2011/2012 (Onyinge, 2013).  
Second, after being transferred, most CAOs regularly delay to report to their new duty stations which 
has a considerable toll on local government service delivery. Thirdly, when CAOs are transferred, 
they take considerable time to acclimatize to districts. The 'acclimatization phase' has ramifications on 
the performance of sub-national governments. This is exacerbated by the short interval at which 
CAOs are transferred from one district to another either at the volition of the Ministry of Local 
Government or at the request of district local government councils.   
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Limited control by elected officials over CAO 
Recentralization has, without doubt, substantially reduced the control of elected politicians over top 
administrators in local governments. CAOs thought that elected district chairpersons were concerned 
that recentralization deprived them of their powers, and elected leaders affirmed this. Though the 
CAO is responsible to the elected district chairperson and the district council, the chairperson and 
council cannot sanction the CAO, in contrast to the pre-recentralization era, where district councils 
could remove CAOs through DSCs. Under the current legal regime, councils can only recommend 
removal of a CAO by a resolution supported by two-thirds of the council members on four grounds: 
abuse of office, incompetence, misconduct or misbehavior; or physical or mental incapacity.  
Elected district chairpersons were of the view that CAOs now feel they are superior and exhibit 
arrogant tendencies toward councilors and elected district chairpersons, for example absence without 
leave was described by elected chairperson as "CAOs undermining their supervisors". Thus, 
centralization has also rendered councils powerless in dealing with the CAO. The behavior of some 
CAOs towards elected leaders in local governments is a clear manifestation of how laws and policies 
can influence the behavior of actors in formal organizations.  
6.  Conclusion  
It is evident that since 2005, there have been calculated and steady attempts by central government to 
unravel components of Uganda's decentralization. This paper has demonstrated how recentralization 
of CAO appointments has negatively impacted on reporting and accountability in local governments 
at a time when there are renewed calls to strengthen accountability as a key pillar of good governance, 
and there are no proposals for strengthening accountability of CAOs (and the entire local government 
civil service). The remedy for strengthening accountability of civil servants to council is to revert the 
responsibility of appointing CAOs to local governments to ensure that there is no disconnect between 
the principle of decentralization by devolution and the practice of human resource management in 
sub-national governments. Nevertheless, central government should, within the confines of a separate 
personnel system, play a visible role in recruitment of the CAO. Within the proposed devolved 
arrangement, it should be made mandatory for the Public Service Commission, the Ministry of Public 
Service, and Ministry of Local Government to be involved in recruiting the CAO. The same central 
government institutions should be given powers to veto any major disciplinary action administered 
against the CAO by local governments to avoid victimization and unfair disciplinary action. Similarly, 
accountability institutions at national and local level should be strengthened to deal with cases of 
financial mismanagement in local governments. These proposed measures will ensure recruitment of 
suitable CAOs (since recruitment is likely to transcend ethnic and boundary considerations), guard 
against unfair disciplinary action(s) against CAOs, and lessen the motivation of CAOs to breach 
financial laws and policies.  
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